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Abstract
The Snowden leaks, first published in June 2013, provided unprecedented insights into the operations of state-corporate
surveillance, highlighting the extent to which everyday communication is integrated into an extensive regime of control
that relies on the ‘datafication’ of social life. Whilst such data-driven forms of governance have significant implications for
citizenship and society, resistance to surveillance in the wake of the Snowden leaks has predominantly centred on
techno-legal responses relating to the development and use of encryption and policy advocacy around privacy and
data protection. Based on in-depth interviews with a range of social justice activists, we argue that there is a significant
level of ambiguity around this kind of anti-surveillance resistance in relation to broader activist practices, and critical
responses to the Snowden leaks have been confined within particular expert communities. Introducing the notion of
‘data justice’, we therefore go on to make the case that resistance to surveillance needs to be (re)conceptualized on
terms that can address the implications of this data-driven form of governance in relation to broader social justice
agendas. Such an approach is needed, we suggest, in light of a shift to surveillance capitalism in which the collection, use
and analysis of our data increasingly comes to shape the opportunities and possibilities available to us and the kind of
society we live in.
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The publication of the documents ﬁrst leaked by whis-
tleblower Edward Snowden in June 2013 revealing the
extent of data-driven surveillance has had signiﬁcant
implications for our understanding of political activism
and dissent. The leaks provided unprecedented insights
into the operations of state-corporate surveillance and
highlighted the indiscriminate nature of large-scale data
collection across communication networks and
platforms in Western democracies, most notably
the US National Security Agency (NSA) and the
British Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ). The documents provided evidence for the
intricate ways in which everyday communication is
integrated into an extensive regime of surveillance
that relies considerably on the ‘dataﬁcation’ of many
aspects of social life. Ordinary users’ social activities
are ‘sucked up as data, quantiﬁed and classiﬁed,
making possible real-time tracking and monitoring’
(Lyon, 2014: 4). This information infrastructure char-
acterizes a particular mode of governance, one that is
rooted in a political economy in which the prevailing
logic is to predict and modify human behaviour as a
means to produce revenue and market control; what
Zuboﬀ (2015) has described as ‘surveillance capitalism.’
Such data-driven forms of social organization have
signiﬁcant implications for citizenship (cf., Ruppert
and Isin, 2015).
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In the multiple ﬂows of watching within this ‘veillant
panoptic assemblage’ (Bakir, 2015), resistance to sur-
veillance by citizens and political activists can take sev-
eral forms. Much onus has been placed on the use of
counter-surveillance technologies such as encryption or
anonymisation tools, and digital rights groups have
been active in advocacy work pertaining to privacy
and data protection. This has provided windows of
opportunity for technological developments and legis-
lative changes that speak particularly to concerns with
the implications of surveillance programmes for secure
communication infrastructures and individual privacy
(Hintz and Brown, forthcoming; Rogers and Eden,
forthcoming). However, the degree to which such stra-
tegies and concerns have expanded towards the broader
range of politically active and interested publics is less
clear, and a common agenda towards addressing issues
of data collection and use is diﬃcult to identify.
In this article we explore the relationship between
these broader forms of activism and digital surveillance
by analysing responses to the Snowden leaks amongst
political activists in the UK. The article is based on
research carried out for the collaborative research pro-
ject ‘Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society: UK
State–Media–Citizen relations after the Snowden leaks’
at Cardiﬀ University,1 the ﬁrst comprehensive review of
the implications of the Snowden revelations from a UK
perspective. It draws from a series of in-depth inter-
views with UK-based activists engaged in a range of
social justice concerns. In particular, we explore the
attitudes and practices of counter-surveillance tactics
and investigate the extent to which resistance to data-
driven surveillance is prominent amongst political
activists.
The article starts by outlining the implications of the
Snowden leaks for political activists before discussing
the most prominent forms of resistance to digital sur-
veillance that have emerged in their aftermath. We
argue that anti-surveillance resistance post-Snowden
has predominantly centred on techno-legal responses
relating to the development and use of encryption and
policy advocacy around privacy and data protection. In
light of this, we examine how these types of practices
are negotiated amongst political activists and outline
the extent to which the activists we interviewed view
anti-surveillance resistance as part of their social justice
agendas. We observe a signiﬁcant level of ambiguity
around technological resistance strategies, while critical
responses to the Snowden leaks have largely been con-
ﬁned within particular expert communities. In the ﬁnal
part of the article, we therefore propose a (re)concep-
tualization of resistance to surveillance on terms that
can address the implications of this data-driven form of
governance in relation to broader social justice agen-
das. To that end, we introduce the notion of ‘data
justice’ which, we argue, would help contextualize
data-driven surveillance, connect it to social and eco-
nomic justice concerns, and thereby contribute to trans-
forming the role of surveillance concerns in current civil
society practice and, potentially, public debate. This is
particularly signiﬁcant in light of the central role of
data-driven processes in contemporary capitalism.
The Snowden leaks and
political activism
The revelations of programmes designed to ‘bulk’ col-
lect data on citizen engagement with digital infrastruc-
tures2 indicate the extent to which contemporary forms
of governance are increasingly based on the ability to
monitor, track and potentially predict the behaviour of
entire populations. This is part of a broader emphasis
on the role of ‘Big Data’ in current societies (Kitchin,
2014) that highlights the surveillance implications of
the ‘Big Data’ discourse. As Lyon (2015) has argued,
surveillance culture came prominently into view with
the intensiﬁed security-surveillance following 11
September 2001 and the so-called war on terror. In
particular, the uncertainty of the form and nature of
potential threats in such a political climate provides an
apparent necessity and justiﬁcation for limitless meas-
ures to be taken to ward oﬀ any possible dangers. The
focus, therefore, moves to the operationalization of
how to perceive of these potential threats, in which
the apparatuses of surveillance play an integral role
(Massumi, 2015). In such circumstance, the rise of ‘sur-
veillance society’ marks a social context characterized
by an increasing amount of surveillance taking place
alongside an explosion in the possible methods and
means for observing and monitoring people’s behav-
iour (Lyon, 2001).
A central concern for Snowden and others has been
the extent to which extensive forms of monitoring lead
to a ‘chilling eﬀect’ in society that stiﬂes the possibilities
for challenging institutions of power and advocating
for social change. Although the theory of ‘chilling
eﬀects’ has historically been diﬃcult to empirically
prove and remains controversial, the debate on it fol-
lowing the Snowden leaks concerned the extent to
which government surveillance may deter people from
engaging in certain legal (or even desirable) online
activities because they fear punishment or criminal
sanction, and do not trust the legal system to protect
their innocence (Penney, 2016). Such surveillance
‘eﬀects’ were documented in a survey carried out by
the PEN American Center in the immediate aftermath
of the Snowden leaks in which they found that writers
are engaging in self-censorship as a result (PEN, 2013).
Further studies have shown a reluctance amongst citi-
zens to engage with politically sensitive topics online,
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such as a decline in ‘privacy-sensitive’ search terms on
Google (Marthews and Tucker, 2015), a decline in page
views of Wikipedia articles relating to terrorism
(Penney, 2016), and a ‘spiral of silence’ in surveillance
debates on social media (Hampton et al., 2014). As
Greenwald claims: ‘Merely organizing movements of
dissent becomes diﬃcult when the government is watch-
ing everything people are doing. But mass surveillance
kills dissent in a deeper and more important place as
well: in the mind, where the individual trains him- or
herself to think only in line with what is expected and
demanded.’ (2014: 177–178).
Furthermore, the Snowden leaks revealed the expan-
sive notion of ‘targets’ that has come to be operationa-
lized in such a mode of governance, going far beyond
what may be obvious misconduct or wrong-doing.
Greenwald points out:
The perception that invasive surveillance is conﬁned
only to a marginalized and deserving group of those
‘doing wrong’ – the bad people – ensures that the
majority acquiesces to the abuse of power or even
cheers it on. But that view radically misunderstands
what goals drive all institutions of authority. ‘‘Doing
something wrong’’ in the eyes of such institutions
encompasses far more than illegal acts, violent behavior
and terrorist plots. It typically extends to meaningful
dissent and any genuine challenge. It is the nature of
authority to equate dissent with wrongdoing, or at least
with a threat. (Greenwald, 2014: 183)
The Snowden leaks provided substantial evidence for
the ways in which a wide range of politically active
citizens is under scrutiny in this ever-expanding threat
environment. For example, documents showed that
government agencies in both the US and the UK
have actively been engaging in the monitoring of polit-
ical groups with a ‘watchlist’ including international
organisations such as Medecins Du Monde (Doctors
of the World), UNICEF, Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch, as well as prominent individuals
such as Ahmad Muaﬀaq Zaidan (Al-Jazeera’s Pakistan
Bureau Chief), Agha Saeed (a former political science
professor who advocates for Muslim civil liberties and
Palestinians rights), and groups such as Anonymous
(Harding, 2014; Privacy International & Amnesty
International, 2015). State surveillance practices have
also extended to the monitoring of politically interested
citizens with programmes such as the one carried out by
GCHQ in the aftermath of the ‘Cablegate’ publications
which sought to track any visitor to the Wikileaks site
by tapping into ﬁbre-optic cables and collecting IP
addresses of visitors to the site as well as the search
terms used to reach the site (Greenwald and
Gallagher, 2014).
These disclosures build on previous and continued
practices of surveillance of activist groups and dissent-
ing voices. In the UK, recent revelations of undercover
police oﬃcers inﬁltrating a range of activist groups
over a longer period of time, including environmental
and animal rights activists, have illustrated the invasive
tactics used to monitor and suppress protest and dis-
sent (Lubbers, 2015). This is alongside other docu-
mented forms of managing and containing resistance,
tracking activities and intercepting planned actions,
whether by corporate agencies or state bodies (cf.
Lubbers, 2012; Smith and Chamberlain, 2015;
Uldam, 2016). The navigation and circumvention of
surveillance society is therefore a fully integrated and
long-standing tradition in some activist circles (della
Porta, 1996; Earl, 2003; Leistert, 2013). However,
with the emergence of Big Data-driven surveillance
programmes, regimes of governance and control have
increasingly been based on digital infrastructures that
facilitate ‘dataveillance’ – a form of continuous surveil-
lance through the use of (meta)data (Raley, 2013).
These regimes are rooted in the economic logic of ‘sur-
veillance capitalism’ in which accumulation is pursued
through the ability to extract, monitor, personalize,
and experiment based on the pervasive and continuous
recording of digital transactions (Varian, 2014; Zuboﬀ,
2015). Not only does the entrenchment of this logic
within everyday communication technologies cement
a fundamentally asymmetrical power relation between
activists and those wishing to carry out surveillance on
them (Leistert, 2012), but the nature of these, often
invisible, infrastructures also carries with it central per-
tinence and signiﬁcance for activists seeking to chal-
lenge existing power relations and mobilize social
change. As Lovink and Rossiter (2015) have argued,
a politics of the ‘postdigital’ in which the digital has
become so omnipresent that it has been pushed to the
background and become naturalized, demands of activ-
ism to focus on the network architectures at the centre
of power in order to pursue genuine social justice and
emancipatory ideals.
Anti-surveillance and techno-legal
resistance
Eﬀorts to resist these technologies of surveillance have
taken several forms. As Mann and Ferenbok (2013)
have argued, multiple types of ‘veillance’ intersect,
undermine and challenge each other in the monitoring
of modern societies. Surveillance – veillance in which
the viewer is in a position of power over the subject – is
often met with eﬀorts to revert or ‘equalize’ such
power. Mann has placed much emphasis on the
advent of ‘sousveillance’ in this regard, where the sub-
ject is gazing back at power ‘from below’, exempliﬁed
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by technologies such as wearable cameras and other
eﬀorts to capture, process, store, recall and transmit
human-centred sensory information (Mann, 2005:
636). However, as Bakir (2015) points out, modes of
resistance to surveillance also include counterveillance
and univeillance that speak more to the sabotaging and
blocking of surveillance as well as ways of making intel-
ligence services more accountable.
Much resistance to surveillance following the
Snowden leaks has centred on these latter strategies –
particularly on developing and ‘mainstreaming’ alter-
native technologies alongside campaigns for tighter
policies on the protection of personal data. To start
with, forums to provide secure digital infrastructures
to activists have proliferated, with ‘numerous digital
rights and internet freedom initiatives seizing the
moment to propose new communication methods for
activists (and everyday citizens) that are strengthened
through encryption.’ (Aouragh et al., 2015: 213). These
have included renewed focus on privacy-enhancing
tools such as the TOR browser, the GPG email encryp-
tion system and the encrypted phone and text messa-
ging software Signal. An increasing number of websites
now support the more secure https protocol rather than
the standard http, and a growing number of internet
users have downloaded tools such as ‘https everywhere’
that connect to those more secure websites. Privacy
guides such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s
‘Surveillance Self-Defense’ (https://ssd.eﬀ.org/en) and
the Tactical Tech Collective’s ‘Security in a Box’
(https://tacticaltech.org/projects/security-box) explain
the use of privacy-enhancing tools and oﬀer advice on
secure online communication. ‘Crypto-parties’ have
brought necessary training in such tools to towns and
cities worldwide (O’Neill, 2015).
Technical solutions to surveillance have included,
furthermore, the development of self-organised com-
munications infrastructures as alternatives to corporate
services such as Google and Facebook. Groups such as
Riseup.net, Autistici and Sindomino have oﬀered mail-
ing lists, blog platforms and collaborative online work-
spaces that protect user privacy and are hosted on the
groups’ own secure servers. Indymedia, arguably the
ﬁrst social media platform, was run by activists in
the same manner, and attempts to create other non-
commercial and privacy-enhancing social networks
have continued. The development of technological
alternatives that reinforce autonomous and civil
society-based media infrastructure has been a key part
of anti-surveillance activism (Hintz and Milan, 2013).
Their adoption by activist communities may have
grown since the Snowden leaks began but remains
limited, so far, as the vast resources available to large
corporate providers and the ease of use of their prod-
ucts – from Gmail to Youtube to Facebook – have
meant a far more widespread uptake (Askanius and
Uldam, 2011; Terranova and Donovan, 2013).
However, following the Snowden leaks internet com-
panies have had to address customer concerns regarding
data security, too. While they mostly enjoyed friendly
relations with, in particular, the US government in pre-
Snowden times, divisions between the industry sector
and the state emerged after Snowden as criticism of
these companies’ data practices grew (Wizner, 2015).
The confrontation between the FBI and Apple in early
2016 crystallized this new and troubled relation, in
which Apple managed to appear as protector of user
interests against state intrusions. The introduction of
end-to-end encryption by services such as WhatsApp
demonstrated a new trend which aligned, to a degree,
with the eﬀorts of non-commercial tech activists.
Campaign projects such as ‘Ranking Digital Rights’
(https://rankingdigitalrights.org/) have advanced the
focus on corporate policies by, for example, creating
an ‘Accountability Index’ that measures company com-
mitment to user privacy and freedom of expression.
While the focus on infrastructure providers and
technological development has been prominent, many
digital rights campaigns have addressed the state and
sought policy reform. In the UK, organisations such as
Privacy International, the Open Rights Group, Big
Brother Watch, Article 19 and Liberty have regularly
issued statements regarding their concerns about sur-
veillance, have organized public debates and have lob-
bied legislators. As an immediate response to the
Snowden leaks, these groups and others formed a coali-
tion – Don’t Spy On Us – which has combined some of
this advocacy work towards a common campaign.
Their voice has been signiﬁcant in the specialized dis-
courses around, for example, the draft Investigatory
Powers Bill – the main post-Snowden piece of UK legis-
lative reform. They have formulated fundamental cri-
tiques of surveillance practices, but they have also,
increasingly, been recognized as a legitimate participant
in policy debates that holds relevant expertise. As one
anti-surveillance campaigner noted: ‘‘Previously NGOs
would have fought just to kill a new law and probably
been unsuccessful in doing so; now they can say: here’s
how we can genuinely improve it and have a proper
conversation with the Home Oﬃce’’ (quoted in Hintz
and Brown, forthcoming).
Litigation has emerged as a key strategy of policy
advocacy. Campaign organisations such as Privacy
International, Liberty and Amnesty International chal-
lenged GCHQ’s surveillance practices at the
Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) which decided
that some of the agency’s activities were unlawful.
Others, such as the Open Rights Group, Big Brother
Watch and Human Rights Watch brought cases against
the British government before the European Court
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of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice.
While the results of legal challenges have been mixed,
they have forced governments to admit to previously
secret practices and have thereby opened up avenues
for policy reform (Hintz and Brown, forthcoming).
At the intersection between policy and technology,
civil society activists have also contributed to the work
of institutions that deﬁne and regulate the standards
and protocols of online communication. In some of
these bodies, such as the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), they participate in individual capacity
and based on their personal expertise, next to experts
from industry and government. In others, such as the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN), they form speciﬁc caucuses, for
example the Non-commercial User Constituency
(NCUC). As technical standards and protocols typic-
ally allow some actions and disallow others, and enable
some uses and restrict others, their development consti-
tutes a latent and invisible form of policymaking and
therefore places standards organisations in both a
highly inﬂuential and slightly obscure position (cf.,
DeNardis, 2009; Lessig, 1999). In response to the
Snowden leaks, several of these bodies have started to
address the vulnerabilities exposed in the revelations by
setting up working groups, developing proposals on
how to incorporate privacy in standards, and, in some
cases, agreeing that these concerns should become a
priority of standards development (Rogers and Eden,
forthcoming).
Digital rights activists and civil society-based techno-
logical developers have been inﬂuential in all these
venues. Yet their eﬀorts have largely remained within a
specialized discourse and a constituency of experts. Our
goal with this research was to explore to what extent
activists concerned with other social justice issues have
engaged with these agendas, and whether there is scope
for linking these (possibly) divergent concerns.
Resistance to surveillance amongst
political activists
In the rest of this article, we therefore explore the extent
to which such resistance to digital surveillance features
in broader activist practices. This research is based on a
number of semi-structured interviews carried out with
political activists in the UK as part of the larger project
‘Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society: UK
State-Media-Citizen Relations After the Snowden
Leaks.’ These interviews were conducted with a range
of political activists, both from big NGOs as well as
smaller community and grassroots organisations
based in the UK, that were not speciﬁcally engaged
with digital rights or tech activism, and individuals
within those groups who were not speciﬁcally
responsible for technical infrastructures of communica-
tion. These groups were chosen on the basis of having a
more or less adversarial relationship with the state, cov-
ering a range of causes, and predominantly out of an
existing network of contacts. They therefore cover a
relatively wide spectrum of civil society activity. The
sample consisted of 11 interviews (see Table 1) carried
out in person (8) or on Skype (3) during March–June
2015, lasting on average 60 minutes and focused on the
following themes: (a) understanding and experience of
surveillance; (b) knowledge and opinions of the
Snowden leaks; (c) attitudes towards state surveillance;
(d) online behaviour and practices; (e) changes and
responses to the Snowden leaks.
In the context of the above discussion, this article is
particularly concerned with the extent to which resist-
ance to digital surveillance features in activist practices
and agendas and how it is understood. We extracted
prominent themes from our interviews around these
issues, based on a thematic analysis that focused on
understandings of surveillance, uses of encryption soft-
ware, changes in communication practices following
the Snowden leaks, and attitudes towards digital
rights advocacy. Below we outline key themes emerging
from our interviews in relation to how anti-surveillance
is situated in activist practices. In the ﬁrst part we dis-
cuss general understandings of surveillance and
responses to the Snowden leaks. In the second part
we move on to discuss how resistance to surveillance
in terms of encryption and advocacy around digital
rights is understood and practiced amongst the activists
we interviewed.
Table 1. Sample of interviews.
Organisation Orientation
Global Justice Now (GJN) Economic justice
Campaign Against Arms
Trade (CAAT)
Anti-arms
CAGE Rights of victims of the
‘War on Terror’
Muslim Association of Britain
(MAB)
Community integration
Greenpeace Environmentalism
Stop the War Coalition (STWC) Anti-war
Muslim Council of Wales
(MCoW)
Community integration
Trade Union Congress (TUC) Workers’ rights
Anti-fracking activist Environmentalism
ACORN Community organizing
(housing)
People’s Assembly Against
Austerity (PAAA)
Anti-austerity
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Responses to Snowden
To start with, the interviews demonstrated that the
issue of state surveillance is very familiar amongst
political activists in the UK, particularly due to a
troublesome history of police inﬁltration into activist
groups. Many of the activists we spoke with had
either direct experiences of police inﬁltrating groups
they were part of or they knew someone who had
experienced inﬁltration. Digital surveillance and Big
Data surveillance of the kind revealed in the
Snowden leaks was less prominent and salient in ini-
tial descriptions of surveillance. However, many of
the activists we interviewed expressed a general
awareness and expectation that these activities are
going on, from either corporations or state, or a
combination of both. Several activists pointed to spe-
ciﬁc experiences that might demonstrate the monitor-
ing of online activities:
I think there’s been instances where the police have
turned up to our meetings or rung ahead of venues
we’ve been using and warned the venues not to allow
us to have a meeting (. . .) they’re obviously keeping
tabs on our Facebook activities but then that’s public
so you totally expect that. Similarly with Twitter . . .
we’re pretty sure that there’s a police presence on some-
thing called Basecamp which is where we organize
online. (anti-fracking activist)
What was revealed in the Snowden leaks, therefore,
came as little surprise to the majority of our inter-
viewees although the scale of the surveillance pro-
grammes revealed in the documents did exceed
expectation for many activists:
I think, kind of like most people my impression is there
has been a hell of a lot more going on than anyone has
known about. The capabilities of the security services
are much greater than anyone suspected but there is
much less political and judicial oversight of this, and
indeed some of this is done on a dubious legal basis.
(TUC activist)
The lack of surprise, or the widespread expectation, of
what the Snowden leaks revealed therefore also muted
any direct reaction to the Snowden leaks amongst most
of the activists we interviewed. With the exception of
Greenpeace who reviewed and revised their communi-
cation infrastructure as an immediate and direct result
of the Snowden leaks, our interviewees expressed little,
if any, direct response to the revelations.3 Rather,
awareness and continued negotiation with the realities
of surveillance have developed over time and the
Snowden leaks ﬁt into this longer-term consciousness
instead of being transformative in and of themselves:
I think it’s about being always aware of the general
threat. I don’t think in fact that Snowden in particular
has had an impact on a single aspect of how we work
. . . In a sense he conﬁrmed what was the sort of thing
people suspected was happening anyway, but I don’t
think that revelation has changed anything we do.
(CAAT activist)
Of course, this does not mean that precautions are not
taken against digital surveillance as part of activist prac-
tice. Some of the people we interviewed spoke of tactics
employed to circumvent diﬀerent forms of surveillance,
such as using anonymisation tools (e.g. a VPN) for
researching targets, preferring face-to-face meetings for
organizing actions, and using encrypted emails for shar-
ing personal data. This also highlights how circumvention
of surveillance is more prominent for particular kinds of
activities (e.g. internal organizational use). Overwhel-
mingly, however, our interviews illustrate the extent to
which the dependence on digital communications, and
mainstream social media in particular, for pursuing activ-
ist agendas undermines eﬀorts to actively circumvent or
resist surveillance practices. Activist groups use digital
infrastructures that are subject to large-scale data collec-
tion for several aspects of their activities, including gen-
eral awareness-raising, advocacy, mobilizing, organizing
and expanding their actions and membership base, using
programmes and tools integrated into social media inter-
faces. They do so because of the perceived reach that
social media platforms aﬀord and because, within the
veillant assemblage, activists themselves rely on the ‘data-
ﬁcation’ of social relations in order to collect data and
extend networks of connections, both for organization
and mobilization of activities:
[NationBuilder] is a programme which is designed for
campaign organisations. Obama used it in his cam-
paign. Labour are using it. It basically integrates your
website with a database and social media as well so
sucks in social media proﬁles out of Facebook and
Twitter and things like that. (ACORN activist)
You start oﬀ by setting up a Facebook event and then
the activists learn tools like the invite all app where you
don’t have to keep on inviting individual friends, it
invites 500 at a time. So we will then spread that all
around people so then you can drive the invites up to 5
or 6 thousand very quickly. (PAAA activist)
Such dependency on this kind of digital infrastructure
in conjunction with a general awareness that
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communication is being monitored and stored in turn
manifests itself by forms of self-regulating online
behaviour. Despite their widespread use of mainstream
platforms, activists noted they were cautious about not
saying anything ‘too controversial’ on social media, or
withdrawing entirely from using social media to discuss
politics:
My advice to our people, our community, is just be
careful before saying anything, before making a state-
ment . . . and think about it, what the repercussions
would be and how it could be misconstrued. So preven-
tion is better. (MCoW activist)
It can get picked up and used in a court or, partly in a
court case or possibly liable. I think people are worried
about liable. (STWC activist)
These types of concern speak partly to the ‘chilling
eﬀect’ mentioned above in which some online activities
and communication are deterred out of a fear of the
repercussions and mistrust towards the system.
Resisting surveillance
Despite such concerns being expressed, the active cir-
cumvention of surveillance such as widespread uptake
of encryption or anonymisation tools remained limited
to just a few of the groups we interviewed, with
Greenpeace expressing the most extensive and com-
prehensive secure communication infrastructure.
Predominantly, the activists we interviewed did not use
encryption or anonymisation tools as an integrated part
of their communication practices. In reasoning this, we
can see a number of themes emerge. Firstly, several
interviewees spoke of a perceived ‘lack of knowledge’,
insuﬃcient technical ability and not being able to
‘aﬀord’ to implement alternative communication prac-
tices. These kinds of perceptions are often combined
with notions of convenience in which mainstream plat-
forms are favoured for their familiarity and ease of use:
We just want ease of access to be honest. Actually,
I can send an email to a few thousand people and do
a few other things and I don’t need to spend days or
weeks actually learning how to do it because I’m not
very technically minded. (ACORN activist)
The question of convenience is linked to a second sig-
niﬁcant theme that emerged on this topic. Activists feel
that using encryption strides against their ambitions of
being an ‘open’ and ‘inclusive’ group or organization.
Several of our interviewees emphasized the transparent
nature of their activities, including also the legality of
their tactics, and their wish to be a ‘public’ movement.
In positioning their response in this way, we can iden-
tify an important perception of encryption as being
linked to ‘hidden’ practices or ‘exclusive’ forms of com-
munication. In contrast to understanding encryption
according to its established purpose as a means of
security and protection, and as an enabler of both priv-
acy and freedom of expression (Kaye, 2015), the strong
role of a popular ‘nothing to hide’ discourse is evident
even among activists. A number of interviewees under-
stood such tools as contradicting or undermining their
self-identiﬁcation:
We’ve got nothing to hide, we’re not doing anything
illegal and we’re not doing anything that’s not defend-
able. So you know . . . if the security services want to
challenge what we’re doing then we’ll have that debate
out in public. And anyway I suppose at the back of our
minds is that it probably wouldn’t work anyway is my
guess. Without spending huge amounts of time or
resources. (STWC activist)
We’re having to campaign all of the time, we’re not
secret organisations, or organisations of tight-knit
groups of people campaigning together. We are mass
movements, and we are open. For us social media is
great because it makes communication easy and of
course we know people look at social media but our
messages are not hard to get. (TUC activist)
The point here is not the choice of tactics that these
groups use. However, the attitude expressed here dem-
onstrates that privacy-enhancing technology is seen to
be pertinent to only a particular strand of political
activism and directly undermines another. Indeed,
there was a prevalent sentiment in several of our inter-
views that being part of ‘mainstream’ groups reduced
the need for concern with digital surveillance practices.
That is, resisting or circumventing digital surveillance
as an activist practice is predominantly conﬁned to
those engaging in ‘radical’ political activism.
Consequently, this might also deter those ‘in the
middle’ from becoming more ‘radical’, making ‘people
more cautious’ (ACORN activist), and thereby keep the
mainstream ‘in check’. This sentiment is reasoned not
just in terms of the legality of tactics that diﬀerent activ-
ist groups employ, but also in terms of the perception of
their own inﬂuence and the extent to which they see
themselves as adversarial to the state (our sample
includes a variation of activists in this regard). In this
sense, only activists who identify with being suﬃciently
of interest to the state feel the need to concern them-
selves with surveillance as an issue or integrate secure
technologies into their practices.
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Such perceptions also extend to activists’ engage-
ment with advocacy on legislation relating to privacy
or digital rights issues more broadly. Although solidar-
ity and support of the cause was expressed across the
board, most activists we interviewed did not see them-
selves or the organisations and groups they are part of
as being actively engaged with issues relating to digital
rights, such as privacy or data protection. Rather, des-
pite mentions of some informal links with organizations
such as Privacy International and Statewatch,4 most of
the activists we interviewed made a distinction between
their own activist work and that of tech activists and
digital rights groups:
Some people focus on things like surveillance and some
people focus on the workplace, some people do com-
munity things. (ACORN activist)
I think there are organisations that are doing that work
already and it’s for us to be knowledgeable and a bit of
a step ahead of the game, but I don’t think it’s for us to
campaign on surveillance. (Anti-fracking activist)
Despite a general critique of surveillance, resisting it
actively does not feature in activists’ own agendas
and is instead ‘out-sourced’ to expert communities. In
this sense, resistance to surveillance was not seen as
providing a base for a broader movement, but rather
an issue in which you need to ‘specialise’ (PAAA
activist).
‘Data justice’ and the bridging of
activism(s)
Our interviews with activists illustrate that a general
awareness and expectation of surveillance is prevalent
amongst activist communities in the UK, but concerns
with data-driven surveillance of the kind revealed in the
Snowden leaks remain somewhat marginalized in activ-
ist perceptions and practices. Rather, the entrenched
dependency on mainstream communication platforms
that are predominantly insecure provide an environ-
ment for activist practices in which it is seen as diﬃcult
and problematic to engage in resistance to surveillance
either through technological means or in terms of pro-
test and advocacy for greater privacy and data protec-
tion. This illustrates some of the limitations of the
often-technological focus of ‘veillance’ debates. More
generally, we can identify a ‘disconnect’ between con-
cerns with data-driven surveillance and other (broader)
social justice concerns.
How, then, might we address this disconnect?
Aouragh et al. (2015) argue that the ‘division of
labour’ between what they label ‘tech justice’ and
‘social justice’ activists emerges partly from the socio-
technical practices that have been advanced in secure
communication campaigns in which there is a distinct
user-developer dichotomy that places the onus on the
(individual) ‘user’ to protect themselves (identifying
risks using ‘threat modelling’) with tools provided by
the ‘developer’. Similarly, Kazansky (2016) found,
based on her experience with providing information
security training for human rights activists, that train-
ing is often designed towards the individual user rather
than as a collective project that considers the enabling
social structures needed for secure communication to
become an integrated activist practice. Policy reform
advocacy, meanwhile, does not address individual
users but, nevertheless, the speciﬁc audience of policy-
makers and thereby erects diﬀerent boundaries, based
on issue-speciﬁc expertise and discourse (Hintz and
Brown, forthcoming).
Such approaches, Aouragh et al. contend, conﬁgure
modes of delegation that come to negate possibilities
for overlaps between diﬀerent justice claims and repro-
duce ‘a perhaps unintended hierarchy based on trad-
itional models of production’ (2015: 216). Based on
their research with ‘tech justice’ activists, they therefore
argue for connecting security engineers with the lan-
guage of collective action within a political project
and, more broadly, for dissolving the perceived div-
isions of justice claims that persist between these activ-
ist camps.
Building on this ambition, we want to further
advance the debate based on our research with ‘social
justice’ activists by suggesting a broader framework
that may allow us to develop a more integrated under-
standing of data-driven surveillance in relation to social
justice agendas. As outlined above, the terms upon
which resistance to surveillance has predominantly
been approached have placed data debates within the
parameters of particular expert communities, namely
technology activists and digital rights groups. This
techno-legal framing of resistance, although partly dic-
tated by the activist opportunity structures currently
available, limits our understanding of the implications
of these data-driven practices that underpin contem-
porary surveillance and dilutes their politicized
nature. The consequences of this limitation include,
for example, a relatively uncritical perspective among
digital rights advocacy communities on ‘targeted’ sur-
veillance which is often seen as a benign alternative to
indiscriminate ‘mass’ surveillance but abstracts from
the experiences of minority communities and political
activists as typically targeted groups (Gu¨rses et al.,
2016). Further, this limited perspective may lead to a
distinction of industry surveillance as largely politically
benevolent and the turn to the tech companies of
Silicon Valley as our ‘protectors’ in the counter-surveil-
lance struggle, armed with PR-friendly encryption
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tools. As Gu¨rses et al. (2016) suggest, these problematic
positions point to the need for a political analysis as our
starting point for countering the systems of digital sur-
veillance that have been developed; one that simultan-
eously broadens the discussion beyond the narrow
conﬁnes of techno-legal parameters and speaks to the
concerns of activists across technology and social just-
ice camps.
As part of such an analysis, we advance the notion of
‘data justice’ as a way to foreground and highlight the
place of data-driven surveillance, and related Big Data
decision-making and governance, in conceptions of
social justice. Whilst recognizing the procedural infer-
ence in the term ‘justice’, by data justice we are referring
to the implications that data-driven processes at the
core of surveillance capitalism have for the pursuit of
substantive social and economic justice claims. This, we
suggest, encompasses both the targeting of surveillance
against activists leading to repression, self-censorship
and chilling-eﬀects in the organization, mobilization,
and pursuit of social justice as well as the role of sur-
veillance in (new) forms of governance that shape soci-
ety in line with particular political and economic
agendas. As Andrejevic (2015) has outlined, the
nature of the surveillance programmes revealed in the
Snowden leaks are intimately linked to a system of eco-
nomics and a state-corporate interest in detecting and
predicting patterns, proﬁling and sorting groups rather
than individual people. Big Data surveillance brings up
issues not just of privacy, but also of social sorting and
preemption (Lyon, 2014). Although much more diﬃ-
cult to ascertain in concrete terms, this has signiﬁcant
implications for people’s lives and the society they will
live in. Data justice as a framework is intended to guide
a research trajectory and types of activity that bring out
and underscore this politics of data-driven surveillance
and the implications of these practices for substantive
social justice claims. This is obviously a bigger task
beyond our current scope, but here we can highlight
some questions that have already planted the seeds
for further illumination and advancement of our under-
standing of the veillance debate.
The term ‘data justice’ has already been used in pro-
jects such as the ‘Data Justice’ organization, founded in
2015, a ‘consumer group’ based in the United States
which seeks to approach Big Data as an economic just-
ice issue, focusing on how uses of Big Data leads to
exploitation and economic inequality for consumers,
workers, and the public (Baker, 2015). These sorts of
initiatives speak partly to the framework we are pro-
posing here by reframing data debates to consider how
digital infrastructures and data-driven processes have
implications for broader society beyond individual
privacy. We want to further progress this agenda by
suggesting that ‘data justice’ can provide a conceptual
foundation for exploring how data-driven surveillance
implicates diﬀerent understandings of social justice as
well as a potential action-building tool for addressing
such implications. This would require us to further
examine the ideological basis of data-driven processes,
situating this form of governance within a political
agenda that extends to particular conceptions of society
and the demarcation of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizens.
Furthermore, it would require us to scrutinise the inter-
ests and power relations at play in ‘dataﬁed’ societies
that enfranchise some and disenfranchise others, high-
lighting also forms of exclusion and discrimination.
Moreover, it would require us to stipulate how society
is and ought to be organized in relation to digital infra-
structures – on social, political, economic, cultural and
ecological terms – that can consider and develop the
meaning of justice in this context. This would include
questions of how to think about notions such as secur-
ity, autonomy, dignity, fairness and sustainability in a
data-driven society and make us ask what, for example,
the implications are for workers’ rights, or for commu-
nity cohesion and discrimination; for welfare and
inequality; or for the environment, for poverty, and
for conﬂict. Most importantly, advancing this agenda
would transform surveillance from a special-interest
‘‘issue’’ into a core dimension of social, political, cul-
tural, ecological and economic justice, and thus
respond to the central position of data-driven processes
in contemporary capitalism.
By advancing the framework of ‘data justice’ our
point is to illustrate how the relationship between pol-
itical activism and surveillance is not one in which activ-
ists are only at risk for expressing dissent, but one in
which the very infrastructures of surveillance (dataveil-
lance) have direct consequences for the social justice
claims they are seeking to make. That is, we can use
this notion to argue that concerns with the collection,
use and analysis of data need to be integrated into activ-
ists’ agendas, not just to protect themselves, but also to
achieve the social change they want to make. As such,
this may oﬀer an opportunity to bridge the current dis-
connect we have found in anti-surveillance resistance
and provide resources for a political and social move-
ment that can engage with data debates beyond techno-
legal solutionism. This, we would argue, is urgently
needed in the shift towards data-driven forms of gov-
ernance rooted in surveillance capitalism.
Conclusion
The Snowden leaks provided substantial evidence for
the extensive nature of surveillance rooted in the mass
collection of digitally enabled data (or Big Data) and
illustrated the intricate relationship between the infra-
structures of our everyday technologies and emerging
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forms of governance and control. Pertinent debate,
activity and advocacy has ﬂourished in response to
the Snowden leaks, opening up opportunities for
many existing technology- and digital rights-concerned
communities to mobilise, expand and inﬂuence political
processes and social attitudes. However, due to the
dominant political culture and opportunity structures
available to active participants in the resistance against
surveillance, debates on data collection and use, and
critical engagement with the veillant panoptic assem-
blage more broadly, have struggled to move beyond
the participation of particular expert communities. A
concern with digital surveillance, in this context, has
come to be viewed as a ‘specialist’ issue in which achiev-
ing ‘tech justice’ is predominantly centred on technical
and legal solutions relating to privacy and data protec-
tion. We have seen this in our research on attitudes and
practices amongst political activists engaged in broader
social justice issues, from environmentalism to labour
justice to anti-discrimination, who have predominantly
come to view digital surveillance as an issue that does
not substantially feature on their agenda.
Rather, what emerges in the broader ecology of civil
society pursuits of justice, is a kind of ‘disconnect’
between those concerned with technology issues and
those concerned with social justice issues as two separ-
ate camps. Of course, we recognise that this comes
partly from the necessity to set priorities and focus on
particular topics when activist energies and resources
are frequently limited. However, we argue that the
nature of surveillance revealed in the Snowden leaks
speaks to an urgent need to broaden the parameters
for how digital surveillance has been understood and
discussed that implicates activists across the tech and
social justice camps, collectively. The ability to moni-
tor, record and store digital transactions on a massive
scale creates an environment that substantially limits
the possibilities for dissent and protest, whether
through self-censorship, chilling-eﬀects or active repres-
sion. Moreover, it constitutes a form of governance
that is rooted in and simultaneously advances particu-
lar social, economic and political agendas that enfran-
chise some whilst disenfranchising others, and
prioritizes certain ways of organizing society at the
expense of others.
By introducing the notion of ‘data justice’ in this
article we want to contribute to the shift and broaden-
ing of our understanding of the role of data-driven sur-
veillance in contemporary society. Although only
introducing it here, by advancing data justice as a
framework for debate and research, we want to set
the parameters for a discussion on dataveillance that
can illuminate the implications for social justice, both
in terms of the conditions for communicating autono-
mously and practicing dissent as well as the social and
economic (in)justices that are produced by this form of
governance (and, therefore, what might be the possible
alternatives). Referring to ‘data justice’ recognises the
political economy of the system that underpins the pos-
sibilities for extensive surveillance, whilst drawing
attention to the political agenda that is driving its
implementation. This, we argue, comes to impact on
political activists and their pursuits of social justice in
signiﬁcant ways and provides an impetus for a broad
collective movement to engage in pertinent data-related
debates. Such a collective approach is needed, we sug-
gest, in light of a shift to surveillance capitalism in
which the collection, use and analysis of our data
increasingly comes to shape the opportunities and
possibilities available to us and the kind of society we
live in.
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Notes
1. The project was funded by the Economic and Social
Research Council of the UK (ESRC).
2. Details of the revelations can be found at The Snowden
Archive: http://www.cjfe.org/snowden
3. We were later informed that CAGE has also significantly
changed their communication infrastructure, but this
development happened after our interview period.
4. Interestingly, also, CAGE participated for the first time in
the large hacker convention Chaos Communication
Congress in December 2015.
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